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Neoliberalism, Piven and Cloward's
Bargaining Theory, and Wages
in the United States, 1965-2006
THOMAS W. VOLSCHO

Department of Sociology, Anthropology,
and Social Work
City University of New York - College of Staten Island

The political economy of the United States during the last thirty
years has been described as neoliberal. Part of the neoliberal turn
involves reducing or eliminatingincome support programs such as
AFDC/TANF,waging war againstorganized labor,and increasingly conservative (i.e., neoliberal)public policies. Followingan analysis by Lewis (2001) which showed that wages increasedin response
to higher average monthly AFDC payments, I update and expand
this test of Piven and Cloward's bargainingpower theory of wages
by looking at other factors which may influence worker bargaining power: unions, interest rates, policy liberalism, and economic
growth. I use time-series data on the U.S. covering 1965-2006 and
find that AFDC/TANF benefits have a short-term positive effect
on private-sector wages while declining union membership, punitive interest rate shocks, and increasinglyconservative public policies have reduced the bargainingpower of private-sectorworkers.
Key words: Wages, neoliberalism, Piven and Cloward, bargaining theory

Neoliberalism is the institutional arrangement marking
the last thirty years of U.S. capitalism. While politicians and
mainstream analysts have presented "free market" neoliberal policies as a means to restoring economic growth,
economic data indicate the neoliberal era has not been marked
by exceptionally strong economic growth, but instead by the
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hyper-concentration of income streams among the richest
asset owners (Dum~nil & Lvy, 2004, 2011; Harvey, 2005,2010).
Part of this new economic regime includes politicians' attacks
on the welfare state-most notably during the first Reagan administration. Not only were attacks on the welfare state paramount in the early 1980s, but so were attacks on organized
labor and "liberal" (in the North American sense) public policies. The 1996 welfare reform bill that fundamentally restructured the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program into Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) was a
major event in North American neoliberalism.
Piven and Cloward, writing at the dawn of neoliberalism
(1982/1985) argued that social welfare benefit levels provide
workers with protection and bargaining power in the labor
market. More generous AFDC benefits compel employers
to pay higher wages and employees feel less intimidated in
bargaining situations when they have a more generous social
safety net upon which to fall back. Other analysts, such as
Schor and Bowles (1987) and Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf
(1990), argued that strong welfare state institutions allowed
workers' real wages to rise through the late 1970s by reducing
the "cost of job loss."
Lewis (2001) tested and found support for the hypothesis that private-sector wages increase in response to a rise in
average monthly AFDC benefits using annual time-series data
from 1960 through 1995. I build upon Lewis' test of Piven and
Cloward in several ways. First, I argue that reduced AFDC/
TANF payments are part of the broader neoliberal project to
diminish the wage-bargaining power of workers. Second, I
examine other variables that may influence workers' wagebargaining power: union membership, interest rates, economic
growth, and an overall index of the ideological tone of public
policy-policy liberalism (Kelly, 2009). Third, I use data on
inflation-corrected hourly earnings of production/non-supervisory workers and single-equation Error Correction Models
(ECMs) with data from 1964 through 2006 (the latest year for
which average monthly TANF benefits are available) to test
the Piven and Cloward hypothesis. This time-frame spans the
historical periods of the capital labor accord (which lasted until
the late 1970s) and neoliberalism (which approximately begins
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in 1979). One should note that it is not yet certain whether the
economic crisis of neoliberalism that began in 2008 signals a
transitional period or the end to this particular institutional
configuration of the American political economy.
Neoliberalism as Class Warfare
Neoliberalism is characterized by the state's repudiation
of the regulatory frameworks laid down in the wake of the
Great Depression and the expansion of the welfare state that
occurred during the War on Poverty in the 1960s. The core ideology espoused by neoliberals is that there exists a self-regulating free-market and they have used Adam Smith's "invisible
hand" metaphor to argue that markets without government
interference are the best of all possible worlds (Steger & Roy,
2010). Despite neoliberal ideologists' attempts to appropriate
ideas from Adam Smith's (1776/1828) Wealth of Nations, Smith
was not the pure "free marketer" he is often portrayed as by
neoliberals (Chomsky, 1993). For instance, in the Wealth of
Nations, Smith (1776/1828) stated,
No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of
which the far greater part of the members are poor and
miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who feed,
clothe, and lodge the whole body of the people, should
have such a share of the produce of their own labour
as to be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed, and
lodged. (p. 131)
In the far-right political climate of the United States in 2011,
such a statement might be grounds for an accusation of
"socialism."
In a complex political economy like the United States, the
idea of free markets is at odds with reality. "A market looks
free only because we so unconditionally accept its underlying restrictions that we fail to see them," (Chang, 2011, p.
20). When free-market ideologues say they are courageously
trying to protect society from politically-motivated regulation
of markets by the state, they "... are as politically-motivated as
anyone," (Chang, 2011, p. 21). Instead, what has happened is
that government policy has been used to restructure markets
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to redistribute income to the richest asset owners (Baker, 2010),
in part by punishing wage earners (Galbraith, 1998; Palley,
1998). Other modem critiques of the ideology of free markets
have been offered by Baker (2006, 2009) and Brockway (1995).
One of the most interesting is Galbraith (2008), who describes
how many of the original monetarists and supply-siders from
the Reagan era have largely abandoned their own doctrines.
What remains then may be free market rhetoric designed to
obfuscate the use of government policies to advance capitalist
class interests.
Welfare Benefits as Labor Market Regulation
The Piven and Cloward hypothesis implies that income
maintenance programs serve as a form of regulation. That
is, more generous welfare benefits function to regulate labor
markets by protecting workers from employer attempts at
wage exploitation through compelling capitalists to pay better
wages. In the context of a "tight" labor market (low unemployment rate), higher wages would have to be paid to prevent
low-wage workers from withdrawing from the labor market
if income support programs are too generous. But even if the
labor market is not tight, generous income support programs
could still force employers to pay higher wages. Additionally,
one can argue that more generous AFDC/TANF benefits have
a less direct "primer-pump" effect by increasing the demand
for goods (and the labor used to produce those goods) that
people purchase with their public assistance benefits. Another
possibility is that higher benefits prevent some recipients
from partially entering some low-wage labor pools and competing with other workers (possibly working for pay "under
the table"). Neoliberalism has been about attacking incomemaintenance programs. The initial public assistance benefit
slashing pursued by the first Reagan administration included
Social Security, but that was quickly abandoned as the potential wrath of the public in the face of such action was quickly
realized (Greider, 1986).
Figure 1 is a plot of the average monthly AFDC/TANF
payment per family (adjusted for inflation in constant 2006
dollars). The estimates were reported in the 2008 Indicators of
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Welfare Dependency (the latest year of available benefits data
is 2006). Average monthly benefits move from $806 in 1962 and
peak at $950 in 1969. Surprisingly, the average benefit stayed
roughly constant through the 1980s. Most of the decline in
average monthly benefits came in the post-Reagan 1990s. In
1990, the average monthly benefit was $600, but by 2006 the
mean TANF benefit was $372. The decline in AFDC/TANF
benefit levels under neoliberalism suggests a reduction in the
bargaining power of workers.
Figure 1. Average Monthly AFDC/TANF Benefits, 1962-2006
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Decline of Unions Under Neoliberalism
Another institution that regulates the labor market is organized labor. During the neoliberal period, capital clearly
has dominated labor as unions have declined in power and
prevalence (Rosenberg, 2010). Union membership figures bear
this out. Looking at the private sector, union membership in
1973 was about 24.2 percent and 20 percent in 1980. By 2010,
union membership was estimated at about 7 percent (Hirsch &
Macpherson, 2010). The major exception to this is in the public
sector, where union membership has fluctuated between
35 and 37 percent since the early 1980s. What this tells us is
that the business community was very successful at fighting
unions in the private sector. Since there are no capitalists in the
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public sector, anti-union campaigns are less effective (but this
changes when capital runs out of investment opportunities
and desires to privatize segments of the public sector, and in
so doing, attacks municipal unions). Union membership data
(from Hirsch, 2008) is plotted in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Private-Sector Union Membership, 1962-2006
+35
o

30

25

0

-o S20

15

-

10
0

5
1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

Year

The Federal Reserve Bank and Interest Rates
A certain mystique surrounds the Federal Reserve Bank
in the minds of the public. The bank's chair from 1987-2006,
Alan Greenspan, was nicknamed "the maestro" due to a perception that his monetary policies contributed to strong economic growth and a booming stock market in the 1990s and
early 2000s (Canterbery, 2006; Shiller, 2005). But what does the
Federal Reserve Bank do? This is an important question, for
although the central reserve chair "... had risen to rock star
status by the end of his long reign ... it is unlikely that most
people had any clear idea of what he did," (Baker, 2006, p. 29).
The evasive and confusing public statements and testimonies
of reserve bank presidents are suggestive of this mystique.
The Federal Reserve Banks are a series of privatelyowned yet partially publicly-empowered financial institutions
which have the authority to regulate the U.S. money supply.
Essentially, the policy of the Federal Reserve Bank results in
the active manipulation of interest rates and exerts a major
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influence on U.S. economic activity (Canterbery, 2000; Greider,
1987). Even many Presidents have failed to grasp monetary
policy. Nixon is reported to have regretted not understanding
what goes on at the Federal Reserve Bank (Greider, 1987, p.
121), but other studies (looking at the newly released Nixon
tapes) indicate he pressured the Federal Reserve Chair, Arthur
Bums, to expand the money supply in time for the 1972 election (Abrams, 2006). Jimmy Carter dealt with the consequences of these actions as high inflation in wages and commodities
coupled with high unemployment (stagflation) characterized
the late 1970s. Carter appointed Paul Volcker to be the new
Chair in 1979 and Volcker's "practical monetarism" of restricting growth in the money supply (relative to economic growth)
put the United States through a recession in early 1980 (and
then again in 1981-1982) with the first "Cold Bath recession"
(Bowles et al., 1990) ultimately delivering the 1980 election to
Ronald Reagan.
Economists and Federal Reserve Bankers are well aware
that they can influence the unemployment rate. As Dean Baker
notes, "The Fed has a more direct effect on the state of the
economy than any other institution in the country," (2006, p.
29). In the dispassionate language of monetary economics, the
"costs of deflation" are referred to as "sacrifice ratios" (Francis
& Owyang, 2004). A related ideological obfuscation is the idea
of a NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment)
that suggests keeping the unemployment rate higher to keep
inflation lower.
The Federal Reserve Bank can influence the supply of
money in the economy, and by restricting the supply, it can
drive up interest rates. By doing so, there is a contagion effect
of slowing down economic activity that can raise unemployment rates (with the aim of restraining inflation). This means
that central bankers are effectively able to manage the "reserve
army of the unemployed" under the publicly stated aim of
reducing inflation. This might be interpreted by some as an
ideological obfuscation. An alternative perspective is that
moderate inflation is indicative of bargaining power shifting to workers that drives up prices and adversely impacts
wealthy asset holders (stock and bondholders). This is because
the Federal Reserve Bank's response to inflation (raising
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interest rates) reduces bond prices and adversely impacts the
income streams of the rich in the high volume bond market
(Canterbery, 2000, 2002). Therefore, in order to quell the first
sign of inflation, the Federal Reserve Bank raises the federal
funds rate to reduce workers' bargaining power and thereby
their wages. Low inflation then operates to sustain the economic position of wealthy asset holders at the expense of those
who sell their labor power.
For instance, the period between 1979 and 1982 is when a
radical shift in monetary policy ("practical monetarism," see
Axilrod, 2009) was imposed by the Federal Reserve to stamp
out inflation by causing two recessions and bringing the unemployment rate up to its highest level since the Great Depression.
Part of the problem faced by the Federal Reserve Bank was
that through the late 1970s, the disciplining effect of unemployment had lost its power due to the institutionalization
of the welfare state and proliferation of income-maintenance
programs (Bowles et al., 1990; Piven & Cloward, 1982/1985).
A crisis of stagflation (high unemployment and high inflation)
by the late 1970s adversely impacted the economic fortunes of
rich asset holders (Greider, 1987).
The rise of Wall Street is predicated on low inflation. At the
faintest hint of inflation, the Wall Street model suggests that the
Federal Reserve Bank should restrict monetary growth to raise
interest rates (Baker, 2006; Canterbery, 2000). How does this
work? An interest rate can slow the economy in many ways
(see Baker, 2006, Ch. 2). An interest rate hike, for someone purchasing a car, can change the cost of paying back the loan used
to purchase the car (say if the loan now had an interest rate of
7% instead of 6%) and reduce the demand for automobiles.
The same thing goes for home buyers who would then need
to come up with a higher monthly mortgage payment. This
can reduce demand for automobiles and homes and the people
who build and sell them. When the economy grows "too fast"
the Federal Reserve Bank "slams on the brakes" by imposing
rate hikes.
Figure 3 is a plot of the short-term interest rate: the ThreeMonth Treasury bill rate. Between 1962 and 1968 the rate
ranged from 2 to 5.3 percent. There is some volatility beginning in 1969 with rates ranging from 4 to 7 percent. The

Neoliberalism and Wages

63

Volcker-shock that operated to discipline workers and usher in
neoliberalism occurs between 1979 and 1982 when the shortterm rates average between 10 and 14 percent. Dum~nil and
Levy (2011) refer to this as "the 1979 coup" and Bowles et al.
(1990) described the effect of these interest rate shocks as imposing a "cold bath" recession. After the Volcker shock, wages
never recovered to their 1970s levels.
Figure 3. Interest Rate on 3-Month Treasury Bills, 1962-2006
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The Ideological Tone of Public Policy
The political landscape of the United States has changed
drastically under neoliberalism. Consider MSNBC commentator Rachel Maddow's assessment of President Barack Obama's
2011 State of the Union Address on her January 26, 2011 broadcast. Maddow quoted Eisenhower:
Should any political party attempt to abolish Social
Security, unemployment insurance, and eliminate
labor laws and farm programs, you would not hear of
that party again in our political history. There is a tiny
splinter group, of course, that believes you can do these
things ... but their number is negligible and they are
stupid. (also quoted in Lieberman, 2001, p. 115)
She then noted:
But the whole of American politics has shifted so far
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to the right in the last fifty years that what used to be
thought of as conservative, what used to be thought of
as a conservative position, is now considered to be offthe-charts lefty. (The Rachel Maddow Show, January
26, 2011)

Similarly, Richard Nixon quipped "We are all Keynesians now"
in the early 1970s, whereas equivalently, Bill Clinton or Tony
Blair could have easily stated, "We are all neoliberals now,"
(Harvey, 2005). Thus, there has been a major ideological shift
in the state's approach to public policy.
Recently, political science scholars have developed a
concept called "macro policy" (Erikson, MacKuen, & Stimson,
2002) including an index updated and implemented by Kelly
(2009) in his study of income inequality. Instead of looking
at any specific policy out of the dozens or potentially hundreds of domestic policies passed each year, we can look at
the ideological tone of all the significant domestic policies
passed within a year. Laws of national significance were originally coded by David Mayhew in his study Divided We Govern
(Mayhew, 2005). Mayhew uses year-end reviews of legislation
(from major news outlets) and determines whether bills were
significant or exceptionally significant. Erikson et al. (2002)
created their policy innovation or policy liberalism measure
using the laws identified by Mayhew (but focusing on domestic laws and policies) and then coding whether laws were generally viewed as liberal or conservative (Erikson et al., 2002, p.
330). More specifically, Erikson et al. (2002) coded for whether
laws and policies expanded government (liberal in the sense of
American politics) or were conservative (contracting government) with a +1 for liberal laws and -1 for conservative legislation, and highly important liberal laws as +2 or -2 if conservative, for each year since 1947, with the index score as a sum of
the liberal and conservative policies (Erikson et al., 2002; see
Kelly, 2009, p. 128). If the ideological tone of policy is becoming
increasingly liberal (increasing the size of government) then
the index will increase, whereas if policies are increasingly
shrinking the reach of government then the index will decline
(as conservative neoliberal policies become more prevalent).
The rise in the index in the 1960s and into the 1970s
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corresponds to the War on Poverty and expanded regulation
(e.g., EPA, Consumer Protection, OSHA). By the early 1980s,
we see the rapid fall, even if still in the liberal-expansive direction, but much lower index scores than in the 1960s and 1970s.
We see the effects of the 1994 Republican revolution (takeover
of Congress) and later into the 2000s as policy drops below
zero and is increasingly negative (indicating the increasingly
rapid rise of conservative and neoliberal policies) through
2006. I hypothesize that greater liberal (government expanding) legislation, in the aggregate, results in increased worker
bargaining power and, consequently, higher real wages.
Figure 4. Policy Liberalism Index, 1962-2006
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Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this analysis is real hourly private
sector earnings for non-supervisory/production workers. I
adjusted for inflation by deflating current-dollar private sector
hourly earnings (AHETPI, available from the Federal Reserve
Economic Database, 2011) using the Consumer Price Index for
Urban Consumers (CPI-U where is this from?). The natural log
transformation of this wage measure is plotted in Figure 5.
Wages peak in the late 1960s and 1970s. Looking at the unlogged series, wages were $18.80 in 1972 and hovered between
$17.60 and $18.79 until 1979. Between 1979 and 1995, there was

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

66

a relatively permanent fall where wages stuck around $15 per
hour. By 1997, wages finally started recovering and maxed out
at $16 per hour until 2006. Thus, hourly private-sector wages
have not recovered to their historic levels of the 1970s.
Figure 5. Log of Real Hourly Wage in Private Sector, 1962-2006
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Time-Series Method
The estimation strategy used here is a single-equation (or
"one-step") error correction model (ECM). This method is
favored over the Engle-Granger two-step procedure because it
does not impose a cointegration assumption on the series analyzed (De Boef & Keele, 2008) and is preferable when analyzing small samples (see Kelly, 2009, pp. 104-106). Some readers
might note that this is simply an algebraic re-arrangement of
the familiar Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL) model. The
bivariate single-equation ECM can be represented as:
(1) AY t= a0 + otYt1

+ P 2AX, + 0 3Xtl +

t

The model allows us to estimate the short and long-term
impact of X on Y. P2 tells us how much of an initial change in
Y is due to a shock in X. 0, provides an estimate of the longterm impact of X on Y (if and how the impact of X on Y is
distributed over future time periods) dictated by a, the error
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correction rate. The error correction rate will be between 0 and
-1.0. The long-term impact of X on Y equals 03 3/o. The ECM
in this study was first estimated with OLS, but evidence of
residual autocorrelation in the initial model indicated that it
was best to proceed with the Prais-Winsten Generalized Least
Squares (GLS) estimator (Keele & Kelly, 2006). I also include a
control variable for GDP (economic growth). This variable was
deflated to real (2006$ using CPI-U) Gross Domestic Product
transformed by the natural log.

Analysis of Results
Model 1 in Table 1 estimates the effect of real average
monthly AFDC/TANF benefits on log real wages controlling
for GDP growth. The long-term effect of welfare benefits is
not significant, while the immediate effect is, and is in the predicted direction. A real $1 increase in average monthly welfare
benefits results in a 0.03% immediate increase in real hourly
earnings-a $50 increase in AFDC/TANF increases earnings
by 1.5%. The effect is immediate, and the non-significance of
the level of welfare benefits suggests there is not a long-term
effect.
Model 2 in Table 1 includes the other components of bargaining power: union density, short-term interest rates, and
the "liberalness" (in the American liberal sense) of policy. The
adjusted R2 increases substantially in Model 2 to 0.871 and
the BIC' model statistic declines, indicating a superior fit. The
effect of AFDC/TANF benefits is reduced such that a $1 increase in benefits is now associated with a 0.01% increase in
real earnings-a $50 increase in benefit produces a 0.5% increase in real hourly earnings. For someone earning $7 per
hour, a $50 increase in benefits would be expected to increase
their earnings by 0.035 cents per hour.
As predicted, union density increases the bargaining
power of workers in both the short-run as well as the long run.
A single percentage point increase in union density immediately increases real hourly earnings by 0.3% and by another
4.6% in future years. The error correction rate of 0.176 indicates
that disequilibriating errors are corrected at a rate of about
17.6% per year. Thus, a year after a percentage point shock to
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Table 1: Single-Equation Error-Correction Models of Log Real
Hourly Average Private-Sector Wages, 1965-2006.
68

Model 1

Model 2

AWelfare Benefits,

0.0003***
(3.21)

0.0001*
(2.17)

Welfare Benefits. 1

0.0001
(1.383)

-0.000
(0.039)

AUnion Density,

0.003*
(1.97)

Union Densityt.1

0.008***
(10.58)
-0.004***
(6.42)

A3-Month Treasury Bill Rate,

0.002

3-Month Treasury Bill Rate,-1

(2.93)
0.001*
(2.29)

APolicy Liberalism Index,

0.0009***
(4.63)

Policy Liberalism Indext1
ALog Real GDP t

0.320***
(5.27)

0.667***
(11.71)

Log Real GDPt.

0.043
(1.14)

0.210***
(8.82)

-0.218**
(2.21)

-0.176***
(6.56)

0.154

-1.553***

Adj. R

0.683

0.871

BIC'

-25.8

-41.2

Error Correction Rate (Yt-1 )
Constant
2

Notes: Prais-Winsten (GLS) estimates. Dependent variable is log real hourly wage for
non-supervisory/production workers. T-ratio in parentheses.
*p<.10; **p<05; ***p<.Ol (two-tailed tests).

union density, the average hourly wage is too low (relative to
its equilibrium relationship with union density) and subsequently increases by about 0.8% the next year, by 0.66% in year
2, 0.54% in year 3, and so on after the initial shock. The error
correction rate indicates that disequilibriating errors are corrected relatively slowly.
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The short-term interest rate, the rate on 3-month Treasury
bills, indicates that a shock to the interest rate produces an
immediate downward response in average wages of 0.4% for
each percentage point increment in short-term interest rates.
However, in subsequent years this penalty to wages will
be slowly corrected upwards, compensating for the initial
penalty after two years. Interest rate shocks can be used to put
the brakes on wage growth immediately, but the long-term
effect cancels out the initial loss, as wages subsequently grow
by 1.14% over future years-0.2% of which is in the first year
after the shock.
The Policy Liberalism Index also has statistically significant short- and long-run effects on real average hourly wages.
A shift of the index (increasing liberalism) by one law is associated with a 0.1% immediate increase in wages. But this increase is too low, and wages increase by another 0.5%, 0.0009%
of which is in the first year after the shock. A shift of 5 conservative laws (a net -5 law change in the index) immediately
reduces wages by 0.5% and another 2.5% distributed as 0.45%
the first year after the shock, 0.37% the second year, 0.31% the
third year, 0.25% at year four, and so on. This suggests that
wages have stagnated and declined as national policies have
become more conservative. Thus, an increasingly conservative
aggregate macro-policy seems to reduce the bargaining power
of labor.
Discussion
Thirty years of neoliberal economic policies that resulted
in reducing income maintenance programs, attacking unions,
minimizing inflation, and slowing economic growth have
resulted in the greatest economic collapse since the Great
Depression. The stagnation of wages since the early 1980s (and
rising inequality) are a contributing factor in the economic collapse. Low and stagnating wages resulted in unprecedented
borrowing by households via credit cards, auto loans, and
home mortgages, resulting from the housing bubble (Baker,
2009; Foster & Magdoff, 2009; Konings, 2010) connected to
a long wave of speculative bubbles and their financial instability. The stagnation of wages is a product of several neoliberal trends identified in the analysis above: declining union
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membership, interest-rate policies designed to punish wageearners, and conservative macro-policies.
Piven and Cloward's (1982/1985) bargaining power argument suggests that welfare benefits (in the form of public assistance income programs like Aid to Families with Dependent
Children) impact the labor market. The reasoning is that when
benefits are higher, the cost of job loss decreases (Schor &
Bowles, 1987) and the bargaining power of workers increases.
In this analysis, I extended a previous study by Lewis (2001)
that tested Piven and Cloward's bargaining power hypothesis.
I argued that union membership, policy liberalism, interest
rates, and economic growth also impact the bargaining power
of workers. Higher real AFDC/TANF benefits do have an immediate and positive impact on wages-but there is no long
term effect. Annual increases in AFDC/TANF benefits, therefore, can help produce immediate increases in private-sector
wages (see also Vartanian & McNamara, 2000).
Union density, interest rates, economic growth, and policy
liberalism, however, have both short- and long-term effects
on wages. Short-term interest rate shocks can immediately restrain wage growth, but the effect of the shock will allow wages
to increase in subsequent years. Thus, if the Federal Reserve
Bank fears commodity and wage inflation, then they can raise
interest rates to reduce worker wage-bargaining power. This
causes wages to immediately fall, and the reduced wages from
the initial shock will take three years to be overturned.
The effect of union density on wages is positive. Wages
adjust immediately and in the long-run to an increase in the
percentage of private-sector workers in a labor union. Union
contracts and the the threat of unionization can compel employers, broadly speaking, to raise earnings (Kim & Sakamoto,
2010; see Leicht, 1989). The long term effect of unionization
is quite strong; this also implies that a downturn in unionization is felt as a wage-penalty for many years after it occurs.
Similarly, the neoliberalization or repudiation of American liberalism and turn to conservativism in macro-policies is also
responsible for the stagnation of wages. Much wage stagnation is due to the increasing conservative ideology of national
public policies. Therefore, the stagnation could be reversed
if there were a major shift in public policies away from the
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neoliberal direction. Workers' bargaining power is stronger
when the macro-policy is more liberal (in the American sense).
Additionally, strong economic growth also supports wagebargaining power. The Wall Street Capitalism model (see
Canterbery, 2000) implies keeping economic growth slower
by having the Federal Reserve bank raise interest rates at the
faintest sign of inflation. A reversal away from this model that
allows stronger economic growth (with less hostility toward
wage and commodities price increases) would go a long way
in supporting workers' bargaining power, along with stronger
pro-worker labor market regulations.
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